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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that
represent current aspects of international law. The Digest
includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply
established legal principles to new factual situations. The cases
are grouped by topic and include references for further research.
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I. TRADE
TRANSPORTATION COSTS NOT DEDUCTIBLE FROM FOREIGN MARKET
VALUE IN DUMPING ANALYSIS, Ad Hoc Comm. of AZ-NM-TX-FL
Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United States, 13 F.3d 398
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
An association of United States producers of gray portland
cement and clinker filed an antidumping petition with the
International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce, claiming that Mexico was dumping gray portland
cement and clinker in the United States. The Administration's
investigation revealed that dumping injurious to a United States
industry was occurring.
Consequently, the Department of
Commerce issued an antidumping duty order, which also
contained the Department's determination of the dumping
margin.
The association of United States cement producers challenged
the Department of Commerce's dumping margin calculations
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contending that the Commerce Department could not subtract
transportation costs from the Foreign Market Value (FMV)1 of the
cement. The Court of International Trade, however, agreed with
the Department of Commerce formula. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Held: Reversed.
The FMV of goods is not to be reduced by the transportation costs
In the home state when calculating the dumping margin.
Dumping occurs In the United States when a foreign company
sells its goods In the United States at a price2 less than the FMV
for similar goods. 3
The relevant statutes contain complex
formulas by which the Department of Commerce can determine
whether dumping has occurred or is likely to occur and by which
It can assess the appropriate penalty.
The United States
producers argued that the penalty assessed on the Mexican
cement was too low because the Department of Commerce had
incorrectly measured the disparity between the United States
Price (USP) and the FMV.
In the absence of express statutory permission, the
Department of Commerce subtracted shipping costs from the
FMV. Wanting to ensure that it was comparing the cost of the
product at equivalent stages in the chain of commerce, the
Department reasoned that the deduction was necessary because
it also had deducted these costs from the USP. 4 The Court of
International Trade agreed with this approach and affirmed the

Department's calculations.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the Department of
Commerce had altered its usual practice in determining the FMV.
The Department had justified the shipping deduction from the
FMV under its administrative authority to fill any gaps in its

1.
The FMV is the price at which the foreign company sells the goods in its
own state. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b((a)[1)(A) (1988). The statute does not provide for
transportation costs to be deducted from the FMV.
2.
The United States Price (USP) is either the purchase price, if the United
States importer is independent of the foreign manufacturer, or the exporter's
sales price, if the United States importer is related to the foreign manufacturer.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1988). The statute requires the USP to be reduced by the
costs of transporting goods to the United States.
3.
See Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
4.
The Department of Commerce argued that the deduction was necessary
to compare post-factory prices in each state. Deducting shipping costs from only
the USP resulted in a comparison of post-factory cost with post-warehouse cost,
two very dissimilar values.
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governing statuts. The Federal Circuit, however, found no
statutory gaps, reasoning that although Congress intended to
include a shipping cost deduction in the USP formula, it also
intended to exclude a similar deduction from the FMV formula.
Thus, the statute was not silent on the issue. Regardless whether
the deduction would serve the statute's primary goal, the
Department of Commerce had no authority to read the deduction

into the statute.
Sign!flcance: The Department of Commerce has no authority
to read into a statute elements that are contrary to clear
congressional intent. The Department cannot deduct shipping
costs from the FMV in dumping cases.
JUDICIAL

REVIEW UNAVAILABLE

FOR SANCTIONS

IMPOSED

FOR

Moller-Butcher v.
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 12 F.3d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

VIOLATIONS OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT,

Brian Moiler-Butcher operated a company in Boston,
Massachusetts that exported certain controlled commodities 5 to
Great Britain and Sweden. He knew that the equipment then was
re-exported to Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. He exported these
goods without the requisite export license. As a consequence of
his activities, Moller-Butcher was charged with criminal violations
and was subject to a civil suit brought by the Department of
Commerce. Moller-Butcher having failed to answer in the civil
suit, an Administrative Law Judge entered a default judgment
against him and banned him from exporting goods for twenty
years.

Four years later, Moller-Butcher requested that the ALJ
reduce his penalty, claiming that he had been sufficiently
deterred from future export violations. The AUJ accordingly
reduced the suspension to seven years, but then subsequently,
the Under-Secretary of Commerce reinstated the twenty-year
sanction. Moller-Butcher appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which Held: Petition Dismissed. The
court lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision
regarding sanctions.

5.

The Secretary of Commerce designates items as controlled commodities

for national security reasons. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1988).
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Moller-Butcher claimed that, in reinstating the twenty-year
penalty, the Secretary acted beyond the scope of her authority
and in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Considering the
reviewability of the Secretary's decision on sanctions under the
Export Administration Act,6 the Court of Appeals, however, found
that it had no authority to question any of the Secretary's
decisions, except with regard to liability. This statute clearly
limited the judicary's jurisdiction to only those issues necessary
to determine liabflity' Moller-Butcher had challenged the penalty
assessed against him, not the issue of liability, and therefore the
Court of Appeals could not exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
The court did not address whether this limitation constrained
it when the Secretary acted beyond the scope of her authority.
Instead, the court found that the Secretary acted within her
authority. Despite Moller-Butcher's argument that the Secretary
had impermissibly reversed the ALJ's order, the court found that
the Secretary merely had vacated the order. Although the statute
is silent on the subject of reversal, it expressly permits a
Secretary to vacate an ALJ decision. Thus, the Secretary acted
within her authority, and judicial review was unavailable.

Stgn!flcance: The D.C. Circuit will only hear appeals from the
Secretary of Commerce's decision on liability in cases involving
the Export Administration Act. The Secretary's decision to accept
or reject an ALJ's imposition of sanctions for liability Is not
subject to judicial review.
No PRVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST SUPPORTERS OF FOREIGN
BoycoTTS, IsraelAircraft Indus. v. Sanwa Business Credit Corp., 62
U.S.L.W. 2506 (7th Cir. 1994).
Israel Aircraft Industries and Quadrant Management, Inc.
formed a joint venture to purchase Fairchild Aircraft Corporation
out of bankruptcy. Sanwa Business Credit Corporation, the
United States subsidiary of a Japanese bank, was Fairchild's
principle lender. Out of respect for the League of Arab States'
boycott of Israel, Sanwa refused to accept the joint venture as a
substitute debtor for Fairchild. Consequently, Israel Aircraft sued
Sanwa pursuant to the Export Administration Act, under which

50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-20 (1988).
See 50 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(3) (1988).
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the President issues regulations prohibiting any United States
person from acting in support of a boycott by a foreign state
against a state with which the United States is friendly. s The

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

dismissed the case, holding that the statute did not create a
private right of action for those harmed by a foreign boycott. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Held.. Affirmed. The court will not imply a private right of action
for the violations of regulations promulgated by the President
pursuant to statute.
The court recognized that Sanwa is a United States person
and that Israel is friendly with the United States. Accordingly,
when Sanwa refused to lend to the joint venture out of respect for
the foreign boycott, the bank violated the regulations issued by
the President.' The statute, however, preempts state law claims
and does not provide a corresponding federal law private remedy.
Although the statute did not create a private right of action,
Israel Aircraft nevertheless urged the court to imply the existence
of such a right. Citing a litany of public policy reasons, the
Seventh Circuit refused to do so. The court found that creating a
private cause of action would be inappropriate when Congress
purposely had refused to provide such a right. Writing for the
court, Judge Easterbrook noted that Congress had provided for
He
criminal prosecution and administrative enforcement.
reasoned that Congress would have made similar provisions in
the statute had it intended to permit private enforcement.
In addition, the court was persuaded by the legislative history
indicating that Congress had considered creating a private cause
of action and then deleted that provision from the final draft.
Furthermore, the court noted that the statute in question
involved particularly sensitive issues of foreign policy, and,
therefore, that a court should be very wary of implying a cause of
action in such a situation.

Israel Aircraft also asserted a state law claim of tortious
interference with business opportunity. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court finding that this claim was without

8.

50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1988).

The regulations were issued through the Secretary of Commerce. See 15
9.
C.F.R. § 769.2 (1993).

494

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:489

merit. It held that a bank does not tortiously interfere with a
business opportunity by refusing to lend money.
Significance:
Notwithstanding a violation of federal

regulations, no private right of action exists for damages that may
result when a United States entity complies with a foreign
boycott.
II. ARBITRATION
"FINALLY SETTLED" LANGUAGE IN ARBITRATION CLAUSES MAY NOT
BE ENOUGH To IMPLY CONSENT TO JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF

ARBITRAL AWARD, DaihatsuMotor Co. v. Terralne Vehicles, Inc., 13
F.3d 196 (7th Cir. 1993).
Terrain Vehicles was the exclusive distributor of Daihatsu's
Hi-Jet vehicle1 ° in the southern United States. When Daihatsu
decided not to renew the distribution agreement with Terrain,
Terrain sued alleging several state law claims, including breach of
contract. Daihatsu removed to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. Daihatsu then moved that the
court dismiss and compel arbitration In accordance with the
distribution agreement between the parties. The court granted
Daihatsu's motion. Terrain objected but did not appeal the
decision.
The agreement provided that the arbitration would take place
in Japan, given that Daihatsu, a Japanese entity, was the
defendant. After four and one half years of arbitration, the
Japanese panel ruled in favor of Daihatsu. Daihatsu sought
confirmation of the Japanese arbitration award in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of- Illinois. The
court confirmed the award pursuant to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
Convention)." Terrain appealed, arguing that the parties had not
consented to judicial confirmation of arbitration awards. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

10. Hi-Jet is an Industrial vehicle used for transportation in large industrial
plants and airports and similar operations.

11.
(1970).

United States law incorporates the Convention at 9 U.S.C. 0 201-08
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Affirmed.

The parties had consented to judicial

confirmation of arbitration decisions.

The district court considered the Convention in conjunction
with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).12 Except.for conflicting
provisions, the FAA is applicable to the Convention. 13 The FAA
has a consent-to-confirmation clause that requires the parties to
agree that an arbitration award will be entered as a judgment of
the court before a court can confirm an arbitration award. 14 The
Daihatsu-Terrain agreement provided for all disputes to be "finally
settled" by arbitration. Therefore, the district court found that
the parties had consented to judicial confirmation of the
arbitration decision.
The Seventh Circuit declined to address whether the
Convention required a consent-to-confirmation clause. Instead,
the court affirmed the lower court's finding that the parties had
agreed to judicial confirmation.
The district court relied on a previous Seventh Circuit case15
to find that the "finally settled" language in the Daihatsu-Terrain
agreement alone was enough to constitute consent. In the
previous case, however, the Seventh Circuit had considered the
"finally settled" language along with other factors that indicated
consent. Nevertheless, the court refused to revisit the lower
court's decision because additional evidence of consent was also
present in this case.
The court noted that the arbitration clause in the distribution
agreement had a choice-of-forum provision. This indicated that
the parties intended that a court confirm the arbitration award.
In addition, Terrain ordinarily had wanted the arbitration held In
New York. The New York arbitration would have been subject to
judicial confirmation. These facts, in addition to the "finally
settled" language in the agreement, which indicates that a court
will not review the matter de novo, were sufficient proof that the
parties agreed to have judicial confirmation of the arbitral award.
Significance: Whether the Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the parties
consent to judicial confirmation of the arbitral award remains
12.
13.
14.

9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1947).
9 U.S.C. § 208 (1970).
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1947).

15.

Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d

386, 389 (7th Cir. 1981).
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If "finally settled" language

accompanies other evidence of consent, the Seventh Circuit will

permit confirmation of the arbitral award. "Finally settled"
language alone, however, may not be sufficient to show consent to
confirmation.

